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For many decades, trade policy in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC)
had involved very high levels of protection and of government intervention.
The active pursuit of import substitution policies reduced the openness and
efficiency of the region's economies. It also increased their external
vulnerability, as they became dependent on a narrow range of export products,
with little ability to absorb external shocks. This state of affairs changed
markedly in the 1980s and 1990s, when most countries of the region moved
to liberalize their trade regime. Trade policy reform in LAC in the 1990s has
been both widespread and extensive, and the region now shows a fairly open
trade regime. Such a sharp policy reversal clearly had an impact on trade
flows, and those effectively underwent significant changes in the past decade.
They also coincided with a number of other important changes in the LAC
economies, including major structural reforms (with the privatization of many
public enterprises and the deregulation of most domestic markets), a surge
in investment (itself partly linked to the lower relative prices for capital goods
resulting from higher openness), higher capital flows, and a more careful
pursuit of macroeconomic policy aimed at preserving financial stability to
foster sustainable growth. This paper seeks to assess the magnitude of the
changes in trade flows in the past decade in the context of changes in the
underlying policy framework. Section I summarizes the main trends observed
in LAC trade over the 1990-97 period. Section II summarizes trade
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liberalization in the region since the mid-1980s. Section III attempts to assess
how trade liberalization has affected the volume and structure of trade flows.
Section IV concludes with some policy recommendations in the area of trade,
particularly in the context of the present global financial crisis.
I. The evolution of Latin American and Caribbean trade in the
1990s: five stylized facts
The 1990s have witnessed significant, wide-ranging changes in LAC's
trade flows. For the sake of brevity, these changes will be roughly summarized
into the following five "stylized facts":
•  The importance of trade for the economies of Latin American and
the Caribbean has increased markedly in the 1990s. Latin America and
the Caribbean's share in world trade (imports plus exports) declined sharply
in the early 1980s, from about 5 percent to 3½ percent, in a context marked
by declining terms of trade and the unfolding of the debt crisis, and then
stayed at about that level through the end  of  the  decade  (Table 1 and
Figure 1). From 1990, however, it has resumed an upward trend and by 1997
it had returned to close to its pre-crisis level.
The region's ratio of trade to GDP had changed little through the 1980s
and early 1990s, with the increase in exports compensating for the decline
in imports in the first part of that period, and the rebound in imports offsetting
a fall in exports in the second part. But in recent years the trade ratio has
picked up, and by 1997 LAC’s total trade was equivalent to about 32 of its
GDP, its highest level of at least 20 years and an increase of 3½ percentage
points with respect to 1990 (Figure 2). The increase in the region's trade-to-
GDP ratio over the 1990s is more impressive when measured in volume
terms: after declining in the early 1980s, the trade ratio measured at constant
1990 prices almost doubled between 1986 and 1997, increasing from 23 to
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Table 1. Latin America and the Caribbean: Trade Indicators
1980 1990 1997
Share in world trade (in percent)
Total trade 5.0 3.7 4.7
Exports 4.8 3.9 4.4
Imports 5.1 3.4 5.0
Trade-to-GDP ratio
In nominal terms
   Total trade 27.4 28.3 31.7
   Exports 13.2 15.1 14.9
   Imports 14.2 13.3 16.8
In real terms 1/
   Total trade 28.0 28.3 45.3
   Exports 11.5 15.1 21.5
   Imports 16.4 13.3 23.8
Memorandum items:
Industrial economies: trade-to GDP ratio
   In nominal terms 42.4 39.8 44.9
   In real terms 31.7 39.8 52.9
Other developing countries: trade-to-GDP ratio
   In nominal terms 51.3 48.1 50.5
Source: International Monetary Fund.
1/ At constant 1990 U.S. dollar prices.
• The trade-to-GDP ratio increased in nearly all countries of the region
in the 1990s, but it continued to vary widely across countries (Table 2).
When measured in volume terms, the trade-to-GDP ratio increased in the
1990s in all of the countries of the region except four (Haiti, Honduras,
Panama and Trinidad and Tobago); in all of the countries where it increased,
except Jamaica and Venezuela, it went well over its level of the early 1980s.TRADE AND TRADE REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 65
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The picture is more complex when the ratio is measured in nominal terms,
mostly because of strong differences in the movements of the GDP deflators
and of export prices. However, the nominal trade-to-GDP ratio increased in
about half of the countries of the region, reaching record or close to record
levels in Argentina, Costa Rica, Ecuador and Mexico. Haiti is the only country
where both the nominal and real ratios declined in the 1990s.2
Table 2. Latin America and the Caribbean: Ratio of trade to GDP
In nominal terms In volume terms
1990 1997 1990 1997
Regional average 28.3 31.7 28.3 45.3
Argentina 15.6 19.8 15.6 27.8
Bolivia 43.8 41.4 43.8 48.3
Brazil 13.2 16.5 13.2 22.8
Chile 66.0 56.1 66.0 86.3
Colombia 39.2 36.1 39.2 57.2
Costa Rica 79.9 96.5 79.9 103.4
Ecuador 52.1 58.4 52.1 85.2
El Salvador 48.9 58.5 48.9 73.9
Guatemala 45.9 43.1 45.9 71.3
Haiti 41.6 23.1 41.6 36.0
Honduras 73.0 87.4 73.0 69.3
Jamaica 92.7 105.2 92.7 145.4
Mexico 37.7 49.1 37.7 71.2
Nicaragua 63.7 59.8 63.7 74.8
Panama 73.8 76.4 73.8 71.6
Paraguay 52.6 50.1 52.6 65.9
Peru 25.5 29.6 25.5 38.3
Trinidad & Tobago 83.1 95.0 83.1 83.3
Uruguay 46.0 43.4 46.0 73.1
Venezuela 59.0 49.5 59.0 78.9
Source: International Monetary Fund.
2 Differences in the GDP deflators reflect both different levels of domestic inflation and the
different degree of currency appreciation with respect to the U.S. dollar. Because of these
two elements, a number of countries registered increases, some of them quite large, in volume
terms, but flat or even declining ratios in nominal terms; this group includes Bolivia, Chile,
Colombia, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela. This pattern is reversed
in Honduras, Panama and Trinidad, where the nominal ratio increased while the real ratio
declined or remained stable.TRADE AND TRADE REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 67
By 1997 the trade-to-GDP ratio continued to show a large level of
dispersion across countries of the region. As expected, its level was generally
related to the size of the economy (Figure 3). The Caribbean economies
tended to have a trade coefficient of close to 100 percent of GDP or more,
while the Central American economies fell in the 60-80 percent range, the
medium-sized South American economies in the 40-50 percent range, and
the larger economies usually displayed trade coefficients below 20 percent.
The only noticeable exceptions are, on the upper side, Costa Rica, with a
trade coefficient of close to 100 percent of GDP, and Mexico, with a
coefficient of 50 percent; and on the lower side Peru and Haiti (with trade at
under 30 percent of GDP).
• Import growth was faster than export growth in the 1990s, both in
nominal and in volume terms (Table 3 and Figure 4). LAC imports declined
sharply in the early 1980s in the wake of the debt crisis, and only grew
modestly in 1984-86. Since 1987, however, with a rebound in capital inflows,
imports have been growing at an average rate of 13 percent per year for the
region as a whole (12 percent in volume terms). With it, the region's imports-
to-GDP ratio increased from 13 percent in 1990 to 17 percent in 1997 (from
13 to 24 percent in volume terms). Import growth was particularly rapid in
Argentina and Brazil, and much slower than the average in Bolivia, Honduras,
Jamaica and Nicaragua. In volume terms, the imports-to-GDP ratio increased
in all economies except Honduras, reaching record levels in several of them
by the end of the period.
Exports, in turn, have expanded at an annual rate of about 9 percent in
the 1990s, both in nominal and in volume terms. Their path has been more
irregular, with only modest growth in 1990-93, and a sharp rebound in the
following four years. The dispersion of countries around the mean was lesser
than for imports, with over half of the LAC countries displaying a rate of
export growth close to the regional average. Foreign sales expanded at a
higher-than average rate in Argentina, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Mexico,
but only at 5-6 percent in Bolivia, Brazil, Honduras, Jamaica, and Nicaragua.
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In nominal terms









































































































































































































































































































































































































































able 3. Latin America and the Caribbean: Evolution of Expor
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in nominal terms, but increased from 15 to 22 percent of GDP in volume
terms; that latter increase was, however, equivalent to only two thirds of that
in the imports-to-GDP ratio over the same period.
With imports growing faster than exports, there has been a shift in the
trade position, from a trade surplus of over 1½ percent of GDP in the late
1980s to a trade  deficit  of  about  the  same magnitude  over 1992-97
(Figure 5). Nearly all of the LAC countries saw their trade position deteriorate
between the late 1980s and the late 1990s, and often by a significant margin.
The only exceptions were Honduras and Venezuela, where the trade position
improved; and Mexico and Costa Rica, where the widening of the trade
deficit in the early 1990s was partly reversed in latter years. In 1990, over
half of the countries of the region registered trade surpluses; in 1996-97,
this group included only Ecuador and Venezuela (Mexico had a surplus for
merchandise trade only).
• Merchandise exports in most countries of the region remain heavily
concentrated on commodities and semi-commodities. At the regional level,
the share of primary products in total exports has declined markedly, from
82 percent in 1980 to less than 50 percent in 1996, while the share of manu-
factures increased accordingly (Table 4 and Figure 6).3 However, most of
this trend is accounted for by Mexico. Excluding Mexico, the decline in the
share of commodity exports is much less pronounced, particularly in the
1990s. Moreover, about half of this decline is accounted for by an increase
in the share of semi-manufactures, or homogeneous products that are
generally traded as commodities. Thus, in 1996 Mexico was the only country
of the region where commodities and semi-commodities accounted for less
than half of exports; their share was about 70 percent in Brazil, Honduras
and Nicaragua, and over 80 percent in all other countries.
Additionally, exports have remained heavily concentrated on a few
products (Table 5). In 1996 the major export product4 accounted for less
3 Data on the composition of merchandise exports and imports is available only up to 1996,
and only for the 20 largest economies.
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Table 4. Latin America and the Caribbean: Composition of Exports
(in percent)
20 largest economies,
20 largest economies excluding Mexico
1980 1990 1996 1980 1990 1996
Primary products 82 66 49 81 69 67
Intermediate products 8 16 15 8 16 17
Manufactures 10 18 37 11 15 17
Source: Own calculations, with data from the United Nations trade database.
than 10 percent of total exports in only one country, Brazil. It accounted for
over 20 percent of total exports in over half of the countries for which data is
available, reaching a record 75 percent in Venezuela. In all cases, including
Brazil, the leading export product was a commodity.
There has been however some export diversification during the 1990s.
The changes in the composition of Mexican exports were particularly
noticeable, with the share of its leading export product, oil, falling from 32
percent in 1989 to 11 percent in 1996. Of Mexico’s 20 leading export products
in 1989, only 8 remained in that category in 1996, with most of the newcomers
from the manufacturing sector. There was also some export diversification,
although more modest, in other LAC economies, and particularly among
those that initially showed very high levels of export concentration -including
Ecuador, Chile, Trinidad and Tobago, Bolivia, Paraguay and Jamaica, and
to a lesser extent Peru and Venezuela. In most cases, the new leading exports
belonged to the commodity sector, although in Jamaica, and to a lesser extent
Chile, some manufactured products also increased their relative presence.
Countries such as Argentina, Colombia or Uruguay, in contrast, registered
little changes in the 1990s with respect to the relative weight or the
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 6. Composition of Latin American Exports
(In percent)
Primary products              Intermediate pdts.              Manufactures
Total Latin America and the Caribbean
Excluding Mexico
Source: Own calculations, from data from the United Nations Trade Database.TRADE AND TRADE REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 75
Table 5. Latin America and the Caribbean: Export Concentration
Share of the first Share of the five Share of the ten
leading export product leading export products leading export products
 in total exports in total exports in total exports
(in percent) (in percent) (in percent)
early 1990s 1996 early 1990s 1996 early 1990s 1996
Argentina 11 10 32 33 48 48
Bolivia 23 13 63 49 79 70
Brazil 6 6 21 19 35 31
Chile 41 28 59 51 68 62
Colombia 18 22 52 52 62 62
Costa Rica ... 23 ... 47 ... 55
Ecuador 49 31 88 71 ... 81
El Salvador ... 33 ... 45 ... 54
Guatemala 20 23 43 47 51 55
Jamaica 51 45 77 73 83 83
Mexico 32 11 48 33 55 43
Nicaragua ... 19 ... 48 ... 69
Panama ... 32 ... 56 ... 67
Paraguay 38 31 82 66 90 77
Peru 20 16 52 49 64 63
Uruguay 10 10 34 36 46 46
Trinidad & Tobago 31 18 67 60 85 79
Venezuela 80 75 87 82 89 85
Source: Own calculations, with data from the United Nations trade database.
Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago: the earliest year for which
data is available is 1991.
Bolivia and Peru: the earliest year for which data is available is 1992.
Guatemala and Uruguay: the earliest year for which data is available is 1993.JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 76
• On the import side, there has been a marked decline in the share of
primary products in total imports, with a matching increase in the share
of manufactures. Primary products, which accounted for 30 percent of the
region’s imports in 1990, accounted for only 21 percent in 1996, while the
share of manufactures grew accordingly (Table 6). The trend is somewhat
less pronounced, but still significant, if Mexico is excluded from the regio-
nal total (the share of primary products falls from 32 to 25 percent of total
imports). The only countries where the share of primary products actually
increased over that period are Costa Rica, Paraguay and Venezuela, mostly
because of sharp increases in the share of food products in total imports.
(The share of food products in total imports also increased in most of the
other economies of the region, but it did not offset the decline in the share of
nonfood primary imports.)
Table 6. Latin America and the Caribbean: Composition of Imports
(in percent)
20 largest economies, Memorandum
20 largest economies excluding Mexico item: World
1990 1996 1990 1996 1990 1996
Primary products 30 21 32 25 27 23
of which: Food 11 10 10 11 9 9
Intermediate products 25 25 27 26 20 20
Manufactures 46 55 42 49 51 54
of which: Machinery 27 31 25 27 26 30
Source: Own calculations, with data from the United Nations trade database and the World
Trade Organization.
The share of machinery in LAC's total imports increased markedly
between 1990 and 1996, from 27 to 31 percent of total imports, or from 50
to 56 percent of imports of manufactures. However, here again most of this
trend is accounted for by Mexico, where machinery imports expanded by 29
percent per year between 1990 and 1996, to a record 38 percent of total
imports. The share of machinery in total imports also increased in ArgentinaTRADE AND TRADE REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 77
and Brazil, and to a lesser extent in El Salvador, Nicaragua and Peru, although
in those five countries the expansion was less than that in other (non
machinery) manufactured imports. In the other countries of the region, the
share of machinery imports has remained stable or declined between 1990
and 1996.
II. Trade liberalization in LAC in the 1990s
As mentioned above, the reform of trade policy has been one of the main
items on the region's policy agenda over the past decade. The widespread,
extensive character of trade policy reform in LAC has been documented in a
large number of papers.5 This section briefly summarizes the main measures
of trade liberalization in the region from the late 1980s. It also presents for the
main countries of the region an index of trade restrictiveness that allows to
measure the extent of trade reform across countries in a broadly comparable
form.
Up to the mid-1980s, one of the main characteristics of policy management
in Latin America was the use of a relatively restrictive trade policy. Most
countries in the region displayed high, staggered tariffs with a high level of
dispersion, often supplemented by an extensive array of nontariff barriers
and by heavily regulated foreign exchange markets. The use of quantitative
restrictions to foreign exchange and foreign trade operations increased even
more in the early 1980s, as a response to acute balance-of-payments
difficulties following the external debt crisis. All these measures resulted in
an even wider disparity of effective protection for traded goods.
In the period ranging from the mid-1980s to the early 1990s, however,
most countries in the region opted for more open and transparent trade
arrangements, combining relatively low and broadly uniform tariffs with little
use of paratariff measures and mostly unregulated foreign exchange markets.
Trade reform generally encompassed three main sets of action:
5 See for instance Edwards (1995); Inter-American Development Bank (1996), Part II, chapter
2; Loayza and Palacios (1997); and Estevadeordal (1999).JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 78
• A significant reduction in both average and maximum tariffs. Average
tariffs fell from close to 45 percent in 1986 to 14 percent in 1998, and
maximum rates declined from an average of over 80 percent to about 30
percent over the same period. As a result, by 1998 the Bahamas was the only
country of the region with an average tariff over 20 percent, and of the other
countries, only two (the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua) had an avera-
ge tariff above 15 percent.
• The dismantling of most quantitative and other nontariff restrictions.
Most countries eliminated the previously pervasive lists of exception, and
nontariff barriers, which had been estimated to affect close to 40 percent of
imports in the mid-1980s, affected only 11 percent in 1997.
• The liberalization of currency markets in the region. Multiple exchange
rate systems, that were common in the 1980s, are now the exception,6 and
foreign exchange controls on international payments have been eliminated
or greatly reduced throughout the region.
Trade policy reform was quite widespread in the region, and all but a few
economies have implemented a significant program of trade liberalization
over the past decade, with the objective of reducing effective protection and
enhancing efficiency. Nonetheless, trade liberalization policies were not
implemented at the same pace and with the same intensity in all countries.
The intensity of policy reform in general, and of trade policy reform in
particular, is notoriously difficult to quantify and date, especially in a form
that can be comparable across countries.7 To attempt to measure the timing
and intensity of trade policy reform across countries, as well as the present
6 The Bahamas use a different exchange rate for some investment transactions; the Dominican
Republic maintained an official exchange rate, distinct from the interbank exchange rate, up
to July 1998; Chile legally has an informal exchange market, separate from the official
exchange market, but the rates on both markets are freely determined and the difference
between them is minimal.
7 Particularly difficult methodological issues include the quantification of the impact of
nontariff barriers, the appropriate calculation of average tariffs, and the relative weight to
attach to different policy actions (i.e., decreases in tariff rates compared to a reduction in
tariff dispersion or a reduction in the coverage of nontariff barriers).TRADE AND TRADE REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 79
degree of trade opening of the economies of the region, an index of trade
restrictiveness has been constructed for the major economies of the region.
This index, based on a methodology developed in the IMF, assesses the degree
of trade restrictiveness along a 10-point scale (a rating of 1 represents the
most open trade regime, and a rating of 10 the most restrictive) that takes
into account the extent of both tariff and nontariff measures.8
The result of this exercise, presented in Table 7, illustrates how widespread
and profound the drive to trade liberalization has been in the region. By the
mid-1980s, most countries registered an index of 10, indicating a very
restrictive trade regime. Of all the countries for which detailed information
was available, only Chile had a somewhat less restricted trade regime, mainly
because of the lesser scope of nontariff barriers following earlier efforts to
liberalize trade in the late 1970s. By the end-1990s, in contrast, only one
country displayed an index higher than 5 (a level that can be considered as
only moderately restrictive), while six countries displayed a level of 2 or
less, indicating a relatively high level of trade openness. In all, for the region
as a whole, there was a movement of about 6 points on the index 10-point
scale during the past decade or so.
The index also allows to separate the countries in different groups,
according to the timing and intensity of the trade liberalization programs.
There is a group of "early reformers" that started their reform effort in 1985-
87, comprising Bolivia, Chile, Jamaica and Mexico. Of these, only Chile
pursued a very extensive liberalization, ending the period with a
restrictiveness index of 2. In a second group, the largest both by number of
countries and by relative weight, trade liberalization was only initiated in
the early 1990s. Colombia and Peru were the countries that undertook the
most radical reforms in this group. The other countries of the group, including
larger economies such as Brazil and Argentina, opted for more gradual
liberalization efforts, and end the period with a trade restrictiveness index in
the 4-5 range. Finally, Panama appears as the lone late reformer, but its radical
reform efforts resulted in one of the most open trade regime in the region.
8 For details on the methodology see Appendix and International Monetary Fund (1998).JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 80
Table 7. Latin America and the Caribbean: Index of Trade Restrictiveness
1984 1990 1995 1998
Argentina 10 7 5 5
Bolivia 10 4 4 4
Brazil 10 9 5 5
Chile 8 3 2 2
Colombia 10 8 2 2
Costa Rica ... ... ... 5
Ecuador 10 8 5 5
El Salvador ... ... ... 4
Guatemala ... ... ... 5
Haiti ... ... ... 2
Honduras ... ... ... 5
Jamaica 10 6 5 5
Mexico 10 5 5 5
Nicaragua 10 ... ... 6
Panama 10 10 6 1
Paraguay ... ... ... 4
Peru 10 8 3 2
Trinidad & Tobago ... ... 5 4
Uruguay ... ... ... 2
Venezuela 10 10 5 5
Memorandum item:
United States ... ... ... 4
Source: own calculations, and International Monetary Fund.
The global financial crisis that started in late 1997 has not led to a
noticeable return to restrictive trade practices in the region.9 A few countries
(including Ecuador, Mexico and the MERCOSUR economies) have raised
import tariffs in an attempt to limit both the widening of their trade balance
and the weakening of their fiscal position, but these increases were announced
as temporary measures. A wider group of countries have introduced targeted
9 For a detailed analysis of the impact of the financial crisis on LAC’s trade and trade policy
see Inter-American Development Bank (1999).TRADE AND TRADE REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 81
mechanisms to limit the growth of specific imports. The most frequently
used have been contingent protection measures such as antidumping actions,
countervailing duties, and safeguards, generally aimed at the protection of
certain sensitive industries. Often, import standards, certification
requirements, and administrative procedures also have been tightened. None
of this, however, has led to a significant increase in trade restrictiveness in
LAC. In fact, some countries such as Argentina, Chile and the Central
American economies have even proceeded with unilateral or multilateral
tariff reductions. This stands in stark contrast to LAC's reaction to the debt
crisis of the early 1980s, when barriers to trade and exchange controls were
among the most commonly used instrument to address balance-of-payments
pressures.
III. The impact of trade liberalization on the volume and
composition of trade flows
Trade liberalization is expected to encourage larger and less distorted
volumes of trade. This section attempts to assess the impact of trade
liberalization on the volume and structure of LAC's trade flows.
The impact of trade reform on the volume of trade
There is no doubt that trade liberalization in LAC has been associated
with a significant increase in the volume of trade, both in absolute terms and
relative to GDP. As mentioned above, for the region as a whole as well as for
the majority of countries, the trade-to-GDP ratio increased to well over its
pre-debt crisis level in real terms, and often also in nominal terms. In most
cases, import growth both preceded and was larger than export growth. This
is consistent with the way trade reform is expected to work its way through
the economy, since its impact on supply (that relevant for export growth)
will generally take longer to manifest itself because of lags associated with
the investment process and the reallocation of resources; the demand responseJOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 82
(relevant for import growth), in contrast, can be expected to be much faster.
In the latter part of the 1990s most LAC countries have registered higher
export volume growth, which could indicate an effective export response to
trade policy reform.
Factors others than trade reform, however, are likely to have also
contributed to higher trade growth. These include, first, external factors,
and particularly the sharp rebound in foreign direct investment and other
capital flows, that considerably eased the external financial constraint that
had affected the region over the previous decade. Policy-related
developments, such as broadly successful stabilization policies and wide-
ranging structural reforms also are likely to have played a role, both directly
(through stronger reliance on market forces for the allocation of productive
resources) and indirectly (through increased confidence in the sustainability
of trade policy). The outcomes of these two sets of factors -namely, higher
output growth, higher investment levels, higher income growth, and last but
not least, the significant appreciation of most of the region's currencies -also
likely contributed to higher trade growth. The impact of currency appreciation
may however have been ambiguous, since it may have fostered import growth
but may also have hampered export growth and export diversification.
The relatively short time span under consideration (at most a decade, in
many countries barely seven years), together with difficulties in quantifying
policy-related factors, and the excessively large number of potential causal
variables, severely restrict the use of traditional regression analysis or other
standard econometrical tools to disentangle the relative contribution of each
of these elements. The following analysis will thus be limited to the
comparison over time of the evolution of the potentially most relevant
indicators. There are many methodological problems associated with this
type of exercise, including potential sample bias, spurious processes, and
collinearity. It is thus clear that the results of this exercise will not lead to
any definite conclusions on the impact of trade reform; they may, however,
help shed some light on the issue.TRADE AND TRADE REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 83
Figure 7 compares the evolution of an inverse index of trade restrictiveness
with that of the real effective exchange rate on the one hand, and the import
and export ratios, on the other, for a number of LAC countries.10 The chart
suggests six main observations:
• First, it confirms that trade liberalization was both significant and rapid
in the countries represented.
• Second, it shows that trade policy reform broadly coincided with
currency appreciation in all of the countries represented except Bolivia.
However, the magnitude and pace of the appreciation varied widely among
countries: it was large and relatively abrupt in Argentina and Brazil; more
gradual but still significant in Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela; and
somewhat more moderate in Chile and Ecuador. Also, it is worth noticing
that the general trend of currency appreciation sometimes coexisted with
periods of currency depreciation; so Mexico, and to a lesser extent Bolivia
and Venezuela, did experience a period of significant currency depreciation
at some moment posterior to their trade liberalization efforts.
• In the aftermath of trade reform the import ratio increased markedly
(an average of five percentage points) in all countries of the group, and with
only a short lag (2-3 years) after the initiation of the trade liberalization
program. However, both the magnitude and the speed of the increase differ
significantly across countries, and there seems to be no strong, unequivocal
relation between the timing or intensity of trade reform and the increase in
import volumes. For instance, the increase is somewhat larger in Argentina,
a "late" reformer, than in Bolivia, an "early" reformer. It is of about the same
magnitude in Colombia, a "radical" reformer, as in Ecuador, a more moderate
one.
10 The information necessary for calculating relatively reliable time series for the index
restrictiveness was only available for eight Latin American countries. To facilitate the visual
interpretation, the charts show the evolution of the inverse of the index of trade restrictiveness
(so that both the index and trade flows are expected to move in the same direction). The real
effective exchange rate index is computed so that an increase in the index denotes an
appreciation of the currency. Exports and imports are measured as a share of GDP, at constant
1990 U.S. dollar prices.JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 84
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: own calculations, and International Monetary Fund.
1/ On a 10 point scale, with 1 indicating the most restrictive trade regime, and 10 the most open.
2/ Index, 1984 = 100





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 7. Trade Liberalization, Currency Appreciation and Trade Volumes
Source: own calculations, and International Monetary Fund.
1/ On a 10 point scale, with 1 indicating the most restrictive trade regime, and 10 the most open.
2/ Index, 1984 = 100
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Source: own calculations, and International Monetary Fund.
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Source: own calculations, and International Monetary Fund.
1/ On a 10 point scale, with 1 indicating the most restrictive trade regime, and 10 the most open.
2/ Index, 1984 = 100
3/ At constant 1990 U.S. dollar prices.
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• In most countries, the import ratio also seemed to respond to changes in
the value of the currency, increasing faster when the currency appreciates
and growing at a slower pace or decreasing when the currency stabilizes or
depreciates. This pattern is particularly noticeable in Argentina, Brazil,
Mexico and Venezuela. Across countries, however, the different degree of
currency appreciation does not seem to explain the differences in the increase
in the import ratio: for instance, with broadly the same degree of trade
liberalization, the import ratio increased as much in Venezuela as in Argentina,
and even more in Ecuador than in Argentina, although currency appreciation
was much more pronounced in Argentina.
• The  reaction of the export ratio to trade reform appears somewhat
smaller and more delayed (an average of four points after a six year lag).
There is also more diversity across countries, with the largest response in
Ecuador (16 points) and the smallest in Bolivia (1½ point).
• The export ratio also appears responsive to changes in the value of the
currency. For instance, the strong increase in export volume in Mexico from
1995 suggests that the earlier currency appreciation may have hampered
export growth. In Venezuela also, export growth seems faster in periods when
the currency depreciates or remains stable, and appears to slow down in
periods of currency appreciation. In all countries, however, export volumes
display a noticeable upward trend, even in a context of currency appreciation,
thus suggesting that the impact of the liberalization process outweighed that
of currency appreciation.
In sum, trade liberalization seems to have had a noticeable impact on the
import and export ratios of the countries included in Figure 7, independently
of changes in the value of the domestic currencies. Currency appreciation
likely amplified the impact of trade liberalization on imports, and dampened
its impact on exports. Neither trade liberalization nor currency appreciation
had, however, an impact on trade flows that can be described as homogeneous
across countries. This latter element would suggest that other policies also
played an important role in either enhancing or dampening the impact of
trade policy reform. Factors that may have limited the impact of tradeTRADE AND TRADE REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 89
liberalization include remaining market rigidities, such as restrictions to labor
mobility, the existence of monopoly positions and other restrictions to
competition, and restrictions in the access to financial markets; all of these
tend to increase costs and limit the scope for productivity gains and more
generally for the efficient reallocation of factors. Inversely, policies aiming
at the removal of these restrictions help enhance the impact of trade
liberalization, and indirectly contribute to higher trade volumes. Although
tracking the impact of such policies clearly exceeds the scope of this paper,
it is important to recognize their bearing on the degree of openness on an
economy in general, and of the LAC economies in particular.
The impact of trade liberalization on the composition of trade
Trade liberalization is expected to affect not only the volume but also the
structure of trade flows, with countries specializing in the production of
goods and services more attuned to their resource endowment. Trade policy
reform appears to have contributed to a significant change in the composition
of LAC trade flows, although here again the impact is mostly noticeable on
the import side.
As mentioned above, the composition of LAC imports changed in the
1990s, with a reduction in the share of primary products and an increase in
that of manufactures. Trade policy reform in LAC involved an often radical
simplification of the tariff structure. Before the 1990s, tariffs in Latin America
used to display a large degree of dispersion. They were usually staggered
according to the degree of processing, with the highest tariffs levied on
consumer durables and the lowest on inputs and capital goods (there were
also numerous tariff exemptions). Additionally, with the extensive use of
quantitative import controls, tariffs, although very high, were often not the
binding constraint on imports.
The use of differentiated tariffs, with higher effective protection for
manufactured goods and lower, sometimes even negative protection for
inputs, tended to tilt the import structure toward a heavier participation ofJOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 90
primary and intermediate goods, and a lesser share of manufactures,
particularly consumer goods. As a result, the share of primary products in
LAC imports was significantly higher than that observed in world trade in
general, which was somewhat paradoxical given that the region had a
relatively large endowment in natural resources. With trade liberalization,
this situation has changed, and, as mentioned above, the share of primary
products in LAC imports has declined by about one third (from 30 to 21
percent), while that of manufactures has increased from 46 to 55 percent.
Again, factors others than trade reform may have come to play. One could
be a long-term decline in the price of primary goods with respect to that of
manufactured goods, which appears to have been accelerating in the 1990s.11
Changes in the underlying pattern of demand, associated with a long-term
trend increase in the share of manufactured goods in total demand, also could
explain part of this change in the composition of LAC imports. Such effects
would likely be reflected in changes in the structure of world trade over the
same period. However, Table 6 shows that both the decline in the share of
primary products in world trade (from 27 to 23 percent) and the matching
increase in the share of manufactured goods (from 51 to 54 percent) are
much smaller than those observed in the composition of LAC imports. This
would indicate that a significant part of the changes in the structure of LAC
imports in the 1990s can be effectively ascribed to trade policy reform.
The composition of LAC exports also has changed over the 1990s,
although to a much lesser degree. This is partly attributable to the above-
mentioned lags associated with the supply response, but a number of
additional reasons may contribute to this result:
•  first, there may have been less initial distortions with respect to exports
than with respect to imports. As mentioned earlier, the traditional Latin
American trade policy regime, relying on high, staggered tariffs and pervasive
import controls, was mostly aimed at protecting domestic producers from
import competition. High protection against imports did discriminate against
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export activity, but this was partly compensated by a range of direct and
indirect subsidies;
• second, the volume of  "traditional" exports such as commodities, in
which LAC has a clear comparative advantage, did increase significantly.
This suggests that there was an output response to the reduction in the implicit
discrimination against these products that was embedded in the previous
trade regime;
• third, because of the large economies of scale often associated with the
exploitation of natural resources, the increase in commodity output may,
paradoxically, also obscure the expansion of other, smaller export activities
that, in spite of significant growth, still only represent a very small share of
total exports;
• finally, export diversification may also have been hampered by rigidities
in factor markets, just as those may have limited the growth of trade volumes.
Even when structural reforms aimed at eliminating these rigidities have been
initiated together with trade policy reform, they often require long
implementation processes, thus compounding the lags with which supply
changes tend to manifest themselves.
IV. Concluding remarks: the trade policy agenda for Latin
America and the Caribbean
This paper has shown that, after a long period of profound structural
reforms, most LAC countries now have a fairly open trade regime, and that
significant changes have taken place in recent years in the volume and
structure of their trade flows. Further liberalization-related changes are likely
to manifest themselves in the coming years, as the effects of trade policy
reform continue to work their way through the economies, particularly with
respect to the export sector. Trade flows are also likely to be strongly affected
by the resolution of the ongoing global financial crisis. What should be, in
this context, the objectives of trade policy in the region?JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 92
The most important recommendation is one of omission -what trade policy
should not attempt to do. It is a recommendation grounded in many countries'
painful past experiences, and it is well worth repeating at this time of financial
turmoil: trade policy should not be used as a substitute for macroeconomic
stabilization policies, and tariff increases or other import control mechanisms
should not be used to control domestic demand nor to address balance-of-
payments problems. There are recognized economic benefits to the stability
of trade arrangements, and changes in the trade regime for purposes of
demand management would certainly have negative consequences on both
productive efficiency and confidence.
A second important task is the necessary strengthening of policies that
are complements to trade policy and that will enhance its impact on trade
flows. As mentioned earlier, the impact of trade reform on the volume of
trade has not always been as swift and sizeable as expected. As a result,
notwithstanding the increases registered in the 1990s, the trade intensity of
the LAC economies remains lower than that of most other regions: in 1997
merchandise trade accounted for 32 percent of the GDP of LAC, but 45
percent of the GDP of industrial countries, and 51 percent of the GDP of
other developing countries. This indicates that there is still ample scope for
structural reforms that would facilitate a more efficient use of resources,
particularly in the area of competition policies, bank reform, and labor market
reform.
It is important also to limit the proliferation of administrative, and
potentially discretionary trade measures. Although, as mentioned earlier, trade
regimes in LAC have remained fairly open, even in the context of the current
global financial crisis. the use of administrative, largely discretionary
measures aimed at controlling trade in specific products has expanded
markedly. The use of such measures partly predated the financial crisis -the
industrial economies have made an increasingly liberal use of such
mechanisms over the past two decades-, but the buildup of currency pressures
probably further stimulated its spread in the region. Most of these measures
fall within the WTO allowances. However, they are also prone to abuse, andTRADE AND TRADE REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 93
can lead to significant trade distortions, as their coverage and application is
not really transparent, and they may end up difficult to remove. For these
reasons, they should only be applied as a last resource, and with strict
adherence to WTO guidelines.
The significant trade liberalization that took place in the region over the
last decade or so has contributed to a deep transformation of the LAC
economies. However, the gains from a faster integration in the world economy
need to be preserved through the sustained pursuit of appropriate
macroeconomic policies. These include disciplined fiscal management and
transparent monetary and exchange rate policies. Without them, there will
be growing financial instability, and this in turn may create an unwarranted
backlash towards restrictive trade practices, reversing a move that has helped
modernize the region and unleash the process of sustained growth that has
for so many years eluded that region.JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 94
Appendix. Index of Trade Restrictiveness
The index of trade restrictiveness, defined in IMF (1998), measures the
overall degree of restrictiveness of a country's trade regime on a 10-point
scale, with 1 assigned to the most open regime, and 10 to the most restrictive.
The calculation of the index takes into account both the level of average
import tariffs and the use of nontariff barriers (NTBs). Tariffs are classified
into five categories, with the lowest range (0 to 10 percent) being the least
restrictive and the highest range (over 25 percent) the most restrictive. Three
categories are specified for NTBs (open, moderate and restrictive), based
on the number of sectors covered by NTBs, on the coverage of NTBs within
each sector, and on their restrictiveness. Each cell of the resulting 15-cell
matrix is assigned a number, from 1 to 10, representing the relative overall
restrictiveness of the trade regime (Table A).
Table A. Classification Scheme for the Trade Restrictiveness Index
                                                                             Nontariff Barriers
Open Moderate  Restrictive
 Tariffs
    Open (0-10 percent)  1  4  7
    Relatively open (10-15 percent)  2  5  8
    Moderate (15-20 percent)  3  6  9
    Relatively restrictive (20-25 percent)  4  7  10
    Restrictive (25 percent and more)  5  8  10
Source: IMF (1998).
With respect to tariffs, countries were assigned to one of the five categories
on the basis of their unweighted average tariff rate. With respect to NTBs,
the assessment was more qualitative, considering the use of standard NTBs
(quantitative restrictions, export and import quotas, bans, restrictive licensing,TRADE AND TRADE REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 95
and restrictive allocation of foreign exchange) within the following broad
criteria:
• open: NTBs are absent or minor, and cover less than one percent of
production or trade;
• moderate: NTBs are significant but not pervasive, and cover between
one to 25 percent of production or trade;
• restrictive: many sectors or entire stages of production are subject to
NTBs, that cover more than 25 percent of production or trade.
Because of its simplicity, the index of trade restrictiveness can be
calculated relatively easily for a large number of countries, and for different
points in time. However, the calculation does ignore certain aspects of trade
restrictiveness such as the degree of dispersion of tariffs, the number of tariff
bands, or the use of discretionary tariff exemptions or "exceptional" tariff
rates; the information required to compute these factors in a form that would
be comparable across countries is rarely available. Overall, the index tends
to give more weight to nontariff barriers, under the assumption that they
generally result in larger economic distortions and less transparent trade
regimes than high tariff rates.
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